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Estimating Implied Valuation Parameters:
Extension and Application to Ground Lease Rentals
Abstract
A problem that often arises in applied finance is one where decision-makers need to choose
a value for some parameter that will affect the cash flows between two parties, such as a
rental rate or an exercise price. Because the values of the cash flows also depend on var-
ious unobservable parameters, identifying the value of the policy parameter that achieves
the desired allocation between the parties is no simple task, often resulting in disputes and
the invocation of ad-hoc approaches. We show how this problem can be solved using an
extension of the well-known ‘implied volatility’ technique from option pricing, and apply it
to the determination of equilibrium rental rates on ground leases of commercial land.
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Estimating Implied Valuation Parameters:
Extension and Application to Ground Lease Rentals
1 Introduction
The general class of problems that we consider in this paper arise when decision-makers need
to choose a value for some parameter that will affect the cash flows between two parties. For
example, this parameter could be the annual rental on a piece of leased equipment or land. It
might be the choice of exercise price for stock options to be issued to company executives. Or
it could be the level of a price cap imposed on a regulated firm.
A typical approach in such situations is to choose the level of this parameter so that the
market value of the cash flows takes some specified value. For example, often it will be set with
the intention of ensuring one party to the transaction ‘breaks even’ — that is, the market value
of their cash flow stream is equal to some measure of the cost that they face to enter into the
transaction. This approach requires a mathematical model that predicts how the market value
of the cash flow stream is related to the level of the policy parameter. We write this model in
the form
V = F (x, y, z), (1)
where V is the predicted market value of the cash flow stream, x is the policy parameter, y
is a collection of observable exogenous parameters, z is a collection of unobservable exogenous
parameters, and their mathematical relationship is encapsulated in the function F . For example,
in the rent-setting problem, x is the annual rental on the asset being leased, y includes parameters
such as the length of the lease and the frequency of rent payments and revisions, while z includes
parameters such as the expected growth in asset value and the discount rate appropriate to the
risk of the asset. In the case of executive stock options, x is the exercise price, y includes the
current stock price, and z includes the volatility of the stock price.
If we know the values of y and z, then the policy parameter can be set at a level such that
the market value of the cash flow stream equals some exogenously-specified target level B. For
example, in the rent-setting problem B could be set equal to the market value of otherwise
identical freehold land. In the case of executive stock options, B will reflect the employer’s
assessment of the optimal tradeoff between risk and incentives. Thus, given our model (1)
relating the level of the policy parameter and the market value of the cash flow stream, the
policy parameter x∗ is defined in such a way that
B = F (x∗, y, z).
However, in practice we do not know the value of the unobservable exogenous parameters; these
have to be estimated. The value of the policy parameter is then set so that the estimated market
1
value of the cash flow stream equals B. That is, the achievable policy parameter xˆ∗ is defined
by
B = F (xˆ∗, y, zˆ),
where zˆ is the collection of estimates of the unobservable exogenous parameters.
Apart from the construction of F , the key step in this process is estimation of the unobserv-
able exogenous parameters z. In order to achieve the desired split of cash flows between the
parties, the components of z must be estimated as accurately as possible, which begs the ques-
tion of how this can best be achieved. One possible approach is to utilize additional theoretical
models that describe the determination of the unknown parameters, and then to estimate the
inputs to these models using historical data. That is, zˆ is estimated outside the model given
by equation (1). However, doing so introduces a new problem – the restrictions imposed by
these additional models may be inconsistent with those of the original model, thus leading to
policy choices that inadvertently combine ‘apples and oranges’ in an ad-hoc manner. Moreover,
when there are several unobserved parameters, using different models to estimate each ignores
the dynamics of their joint determination. Finally, even where these problems do not arise, the
models or the data used to estimate the unobserved parameters may simply be unsuitable for
that purpose.1
An alternative, and more consistent, approach is to estimate z within the model described by
equation (1). That is, given data on actual market values for assets similar to the one of interest,
we back out the value of z implied by (1). This method is, of course, akin to that commonly
employed in the field of option pricing to estimate stock price volatility.2 Valuing a stock option
using standard pricing methods requires knowledge of the underlying stock volatility, which is
unobservable. But reliable estimates can be obtained by inferring the volatility level that is
consistent with (i.e., implied by) the observed market price of a similar option written on the
same stock. This volatility estimate is then plugged back into the pricing formula in order to
calculate the original option’s value. Somewhat surprisingly, this approach has not previously
been applied to the more general class of problems described above, perhaps because it is not
immediately clear how, or whether, it can be easily extended to the situation where z is a
vector, i.e., when there are multiple unobserved parameters. Also, once one moves outside
financial markets, it would be unusual to observe multiple claims and market prices for the
same underlying asset.
In this paper, we show how the within-model approach can be generalized to accommodate
these issues. Suppose first that there exist market data on sales of n assets that are similar to
the one that is the central object of study. For each such sale we observe the sales price (Vn),
1For example, suppose the unobservable parameter is a risk-adjusted discount rate. Then an obvious approach
is to use some theoretical model of risk adjustment such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). But the
latter is strictly applicable only to the highly liquid assets traded in financial markets, and thus may provide
highly biased estimates of discount rates for much less liquid assets such as land.
2For extensive reviews of this literature, see Corrado and Miller (1996) and Mayhew (1995).
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the policy parameter associated with that particular asset (xn), and the observable exogenous
parameters (yn). We can then use this data to estimate the unobservable exogenous parameters
(z) using the regression equation
Vn = f(F (xn, yn, z), εn), n = 1, 2, . . . , N, (2)
for some function f of the theoretical market value F and a noise term εn. This form offers a
variety of possibilities. For example, as we shall see below, one possibility is f(V, ε) = V eε, or
equivalently
log Vn = logF (xn, yn, z) + εn.
Of course, as the function F will typically be nonlinear, equation (2) is likely to be somewhat
complex. But so long as the exact form of F is known and the necessary data are available, this
is easily accommodated by standard nonlinear regression methods. In this way, we can obtain
internally consistent estimates of z implied by a single valuation framework and thus avoid the
need to utilise a variety of ad hoc methods and estimates.
In the remainder of the paper, we illustrate this approach using the concrete example of the
rent-setting problem. In particular, we focus on the determination of equilibrium rental rates
for ground leases of commercial land, as such transactions are economically significant and have
received considerable recent attention in the literature (e.g., Dale-Johnson, 2001; Grenadier,
2005; Lally and Randal, 2004). The next section sets out a ground lease valuation model
corresponding to equation (1), identifies the unobservable parameters, and shows how equation
(2) can be used to estimate these. Section 3 applies this last step to some real-world data, while
Section 4 offers some concluding remarks.
2 Application: Ground Lease Rentals
Ownership and use of long-lived assets such as land and infrastructure investments are often
separated. Historically, land was provided as an endowment to institutions such as churches and
universities, or to fund the development of railways, and the beneficiaries of those endowments
then leased use of the land in perpetuity to maximise the rental income obtained from the en-
dowment (Jackson, 1999). More recently investors have used long-term renewable leases to allow
specialisation in the ownership and management of commercial real estate and infrastructure
assets.
Long-term leases of unimproved land (commonly known as ground leases) normally provide
for periodic reviews of the lease payments. In such reviews, the first step typically involves
seeking agreement between the lessor and lessee, and where there is no agreement, through an
arbitration process. Such leases have the following general characteristics:
1. Rental payments are due every m years in advance and are fixed in nominal terms for T
years at which time they are reviewed.
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2. There are n rent revisions scheduled during the life of the lease, i.e., the lease has a total
length of nT years.
3. The rent set at each review is based on the current market value of the land leased in an
unimproved state, with no account taken of the value of the improvements affected by the
lessee.
4. All expenses associated with the use of the property are payable by the lessee.
5. If the lease is forfeited or not renewed, all buildings and other improvements on the land
revert to the lessor free from any payment or compensation.
6. The lessee may assign, sub-lease or sell his interest in the land with the consent of the
lessor.
7. The lessor may assign or sell his interest in the land.
A crucial aspect of these leases, at both the date of inception and at subsequent review dates,
is the setting of the rental payments to be made by the lessee. For the lease to be acceptable
to both parties, the present value of these payments over the life of the lease must be equal to
the market value of otherwise-equivalent unimproved freehold land. At a higher rental rate, the
present value of rental payments is greater than the land value and the lessee would prefer to
buy the land. At a lower rental rate, the present value of rental payments is less than the land
value and the lessor would prefer to sell the land. From the financial economist’s perspective,
the interesting question is: what is the equilibrium rental rate? As a practical matter, this
issue arises whenever the lessor and lessee are unable to agree. We now show how the approach
described in the previous section can be used to shed light on this question.
2.1 The valuation model
The first step is to build a valuation model corresponding to the function F in equation (1).
Because estimation of (2) requires that the model be applicable to sales of leases occurring at
any date during the rental cycle, we need to allow for the possibility that an arbitrary number
of years, S, has elapsed since the most recent review date. Suppose that similar unimproved
land was determined to have value L0 at the most recent review date and that an annual rental
payment of C was set; such land is now worth LS.
When viewed from time S, the change in rent payments at the next review can be broken
into two parts. First, unimproved land values have already grown by a factor of LS/L0 in the
current cycle. Second, they are expected to grow by a factor of eg(T−S) over the remainder of
the cycle, where g is the continuously compounded expected annual growth rate in unimproved
land value (which we assume to be constant). Thus, the expected annual rent payment during
the next rent period equals
C · LS
L0
· eg(T−S).
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The expected annual rent payment in the subsequent rent period equals
C · LS
L0
· eg(2T−S),
where we have allowed for further growth of egT in the land value. All subsequent expected rent
payments can be calculated in the same way.
After allowing for tax and the fact that the next rent review is only T − S years away, the
present value of the rent payments received over the remainder of the current cycle is
(1− tc)mC
(
1 +
1
erm
+ . . .+
1
er(T−S−m)
)
= (1− tc)mC
1− e−r(T−S)
1− e−rm ,
where r denotes the risk-free interest rate and tc the tax rate. These payments are discounted
at the risk-free interest rate because the rent payment only changes at the end of the current
cycle, and so are risk-free within the current cycle. At the time of the next rent review (that is,
at date T ) the present value of the rent payments received over the subsequent cycle will equal
(1− tc)mC
LT
L0
(
1 +
1
erm
+ . . .+
1
er(T−m)
)
= (1− tc)mC
LT
L0
1− e−rT
1− e−rm .
To calculate their present value at date S we must discount the expected value of this expression
back to date S using the risk-adjusted discount rate appropriate for land-value risk, k. Thus,
the date S present value equals
(1− tc)mC
LS
L0
e(g−k)(T−S)
1− e−rT
1− e−rm .
Post-tax cash flows received over future rent cycles can be valued in the same way.
Putting the pieces together shows that the market value of the lessor’s interest in this lease
is currently equal to
VS = (1− tc)mC
1− e−r(T−S)
1− e−rm
+ (1− tc)mC
LS
L0
e(g−k)(T−S)
1− e−rT
1− e−rm
+ (1− tc)mC
LS
L0
e(g−k)(2T−S)
1− e−rT
1− e−rm
+ . . .+ (1− tc)mC
LS
L0
e(g−k)((n−1)T−S)
1− e−rT
1− e−rm
+ LSe
(g−k)(nT−S),
where the final term is the expected (discounted) value of the land at the end of the lease.
Simplifying the various geometric series appearing in this equation yields
VS = (1− tc)mC
(
1− e−r(T−S)
1− e−rm
)
+ (1− tc)mC
LS
L0
e(g−k)(T−S)
(
1− e−rT
1− e−rm
)
1− e(g−k)(n−1)T
1− e(g−k)T
(3)
+ LSe
(g−k)(nT−S).
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This is our valuation model. Relating it back to equation (1), the policy parameter x is the
rental payment C, the observable exogenous parameters are y = (m,n, S, T, tc, L0, LS , r), and
the unobservable exogenous parameters are z = (g, k).
2.2 Setting the policy parameter
Given estimates of g and k, we can use the valuation model (3) to determine the equilibrium
rental payment C. Since this is set at the time of a rent review (when S = 0 and LS = L0), we
use the corresponding special case of (3):3
V0 = (1− tc)mC
(
1− e−rT
1− e−rm
)
1− e(g−k)nT
1− e(g−k)T
+ L0e
(g−k)nT .
The rental payment C that makes this equal to the land value is the level of C such that
L0 = (1− tc)mC
(
1− e−rT
1− e−rm
)
1− e(g−k)nT
1− e(g−k)T
+ L0e
(g−k)nT .
Solving this equation for C yields
C =
1− e−(k−g)T
(1− tc)m
(
1− e−rm
1− e−rT
)
L0. (4)
Clearly, implementation of equation (4) requires us to estimate the unobservable exogenous
parameters g and k. Note, however, that C does not depend on the individual values of g and
k, but only on their relative value, as indicated by the term φ = k − g. If φ is high, then the
proportion of total return offered by expected capital gain is low, and hence the required rental
rate is high; if φ is low, then the proportion of total return offered by expected capital gain is
high, and hence the required rental rate is low. As a result, alternative combinations of g and
k that yield the same value of φ have no effect on C.
One way of implementing equation (4) is to estimate g and k using additional external
models. For example, the CAPM could be used to calculate k while g could be estimated as
the average annual growth rate in historical land price data. However, as discussed in section 1,
this approach has significant disadvantages.4 Instead, as we now show, a simpler method that
requires only the original valuation model is possible.
3Lally (2001) and Lally and Randal (2004) use the discrete-compounding version of this equation in their
analyses of the rent-setting problem.
4In particular, financial market models such as the CAPM assumes that all assets are freely marketable,
perfectly divisible, and highly liquid. Although such assumptions are perfectly reasonable for most financial
markets, they are not a very good description of land markets. Sales of land are often time consuming, while
marketing of the land and transfer of title are both costly. Land is also a lumpy asset: the need to create
complex covenants to facilitate capital intensive use of a site with multiple owners, as well as regulatory/planning
restrictions on minimum lot size, mean that it is not easily divisible into small units to facilitate individual title
to many owners. As a result, the CAPM is likely to significantly understate k because it makes no allowance for
the risks associated with poor liquidity. Many studies in finance (e.g., Silber, 1991; Longstaff, 1995; Acharya and
Pedersen, 2005) suggest that investors rationally require a higher rate of return to invest in illiquid assets such as
land, and that this premium can be large.
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2.3 Estimating the unobservable parameters
Suppose there exist market data on secondary market transactions in ground lease rentals, i.e.,
where the lessor sells his interest in a ground lease to a third party (who could potentially be
the lessee). The asset traded in such transactions offers (i) the right to receive rental payments
during the remaining term of the lease and (ii) the right to the land at the termination of the
lease. Thus, the equilibrium price PS of a sale that occurs S years into a lease must be equal
to the present value of the remaining rental payments plus the residual land value at the end of
the lease, which is the expression in (3). We can rewrite this as
PS − (1− tc)mC
(
1− e−r(T−S)
1− e−rm
)
=
(
LS
L0
)
A, (5)
where
A = (1− tc)mCe(g−k)(T−S)
(
1− e−rT
1− e−rm
)
1− e(g−k)(n−1)T
1− e(g−k)T
+ L0e
(g−k)(nT−S)
Assuming that the rental payment for this lease was set consistent with (4), the expression for
A reduces to
A =
(
1− e−rT
1− e−rm
)(
(1− tc)mC
1− e(g−k)T
)
e(g−k)(T−S)
We can therefore rewrite equation (5) as
QS =
(
e(g−k)(T−S)
1− e(g−k)T
)(
LS
L0
)
, (6)
where
QS =
PS
(1− tc)mC
(
1− e−rm
1− e−rT
)
−
(
1− e−r(T−S)
1− e−rT
)
is a linear transformation of the lease’s price-earnings ratio.5 Note that all components of QS
are observable, so for any given realisation of LS/L0 there is a unique value of φ that satisfies
equation (6).
To close the model, we therefore need some assumption about the distribution of the unim-
proved land growth factor LS/L0. We suppose that LS follows a geometric Brownian motion
with volatility σ and drift g.6 That is
LS = L0 exp
((
g − σ
2
2
)
S + εS
)
, εS ∼ N(0, σ2S),
Taking the natural logarithm of each side of (6), using the above process for LS , and splitting
k into a risk-free component (r) and a time-invariant risk premium (λ), yields
logQS = S
(
r + λ− σ
2
2
)
− log
(
e(r+λ−g)T − 1
)
+ εS , (7)
5For a lease with a one-year term (T = 1) and annual rent payments (m = 1) that is sold on a rent-setting
date (S = 0), QS = PS/((1− tc)C)− 1.
6Note that this assumption implies E0[LS ] = e
gSL0, consistent with our earlier assumption that unimproved
land value is expected to grow at a constant rate g.
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which is readily recognisable as a standard regression model with heteroskedastic disturbances
and unknown parameters g, λ, and σ. Although this model is nonlinear, it is straightforward to
obtain maximum likelihood estimates of these parameters from market data, which can then be
used in equation (4) to arrive at a value for C.7 Overall, only the ground lease valuation model
and data on sales of ground leases are required.8
One cautionary note is in order. Although the within-model approach described by equations
(3)–(7) provides a simple and internally-consistent method for estimating a ground lease rental
rate, it is crucially dependent on the assumption that market prices for lease sales are reliable
indicators of value, i.e., that the secondary market for ground leases is in some sense ‘efficient’.
In this context, one potential problem is the presence of ‘fire sales’ — leases that are sold
for an artificially low price due to financial distress on the part of the original lessor. If such
transactions were prevalent in the data used to estimate (7), then the estimated value of λ —
and hence C — would tend to be biased upwards. However, (7) is only defined when QS > 0;
that is, when
PS
(1− tc)C
> m
(
1− e−r(T−S)
1− e−rm
)
,
where the right-hand term is approximately equal to T −S. Consequently, equation (7) can only
be estimated when the sale price exceeds total rent payments remaining in the current cycle,
which automatically rules out transactions with obvious fire sales qualities.
3 Example
To illustrate the approach described in Section 2.3, we consider a lease that requires rent to be
paid annually (m=1), set the tax rate equal to 0.33, the current risk-free interest rate r′ to 0.045
(i.e., the rate prevailing on the rent-setting day for the lease whose equilibrium rental rate we
wish to determine), and use data from 30 ground lease sales that occurred in the Wellington
region of New Zealand between April 1993 and March 2007.9 The details of these transactions
are listed in Table 1. As a proxy for r, we use the 5-year government bond rate prevailing on
the date that the sale occurred.
Estimating equation (7) using the Table 1 data yields the results appearing in Table 2.10
7In applying this procedure, g, λ, and σ are chosen to minimize the weighted sum of squared errors, where
the weight allocated to each data point is the reciprocal of the number of years between the sale and the most
recent revision. It follows that sales that occur a long time into a lease cycle have a relatively low influence on
parameter estimates.
8Note also that if the lease under consideration has a so-called ratchet clause (whereby rents can never fall
from one period to the next) that necessitates the use of option pricing methods, our approach’s estimate of σ
eliminates the need to undertake a separate estimation of land value volatility.
9We are grateful to Wareham Cameron Ltd for providing this information. One further transaction was deleted
from the sample because it failed to pass the fire sale test described above.
10Because information on the frequency of rent payments is unavailable, we assume that all leases in Table 2
make annual payments. We also assume tc = 0.33, the statutory corporate tax rate in New Zealand throughout
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Table 1: Data on Ground Lease Sales
This table summarises data from 30 ground lease sales that occurred in the Wellington region
between April 1993 and March 2007. T is the term of the lease in years, S is the number of years
between the date on which the sale occurred and the previous rent review date, C is the annual rent
payment on the lease as set at the last review date, P is the price at which the lease was sold, and
r is the after-tax 5-year government bond rate prevailing on the date that the sale occurred.
SOLI T S C P r
1 21.083 0.764 35438 390000 0.042
2 14.075 0.833 149688 1855000 0.049
3 5.000 0.833 60000 640000 0.039
4 13.997 0.842 87857 850000 0.047
5 5.000 0.917 6977 110000 0.049
6 7.000 1.303 100000 920000 0.057
7 14.000 1.314 59500 740000 0.039
8 5.000 1.750 24464 330000 0.048
9 2.964 1.881 90000 800000 0.048
10 5.000 2.167 39000 420000 0.058
11 5.000 2.250 5450 62500 0.052
12 12.000 2.333 315000 3302500 0.057
13 21.000 2.400 24625 352000 0.044
14 21.000 2.917 172500 2350000 0.038
15 7.000 3.333 28125 354000 0.057
16 21.000 3.583 12378 165000 0.048
17 5.000 4.167 516250 9831375 0.043
18 5.000 4.167 225060 4083750 0.043
19 5.083 4.917 13500 235000 0.056
20 7.000 4.919 15148 168000 0.040
21 7.000 5.667 47303 525583 0.046
22 21.000 8.658 41915 450000 0.057
23 12.000 8.917 122000 2000000 0.039
24 21.000 9.333 550400 5181500 0.047
25 21.000 9.917 76000 875000 0.039
26 20.000 10.333 6175 65000 0.039
27 21.000 12.000 514528 4100000 0.039
28 13.997 12.342 87857 6700000 0.040
29 21.000 15.083 51800 550000 0.044
30 21.083 18.667 30987 750000 0.040
The first three columns show the maximum likelihood estimates of the long-run expected growth
rate in the value of unimproved land (gˆ), the risk premium component of the expected return
on such land (λˆ), and the volatility in the growth of land value (σˆ); asymptotic standard errors
for these estimates are given in parentheses. The fourth column shows the resulting estimate
of φ = r′ + λ − g. The final three columns then use equation (4) to estimate the rental rate
Rˆ = C/L0 for this lease, assuming lease terms of 5, 10 and 21 years respectively. We use the
delta method (see Greene, 2003; and Xu and Long, 2005) to obtain standard errors for φˆ and
Rˆ.
We first check the model specification: if correctly specified, then the standardized residuals
(i.e., the residual for each sale divided by
√
S) should be normally distributed. The Bera-Jarque
the period covered by our data.
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Table 2: Maximum likelihood estimates of equation (7) using data on ground lease sales
Assuming a lease with annual rent payments (m = 1.0) and a current risk-free interest rate of 4.5%
(r′=0.045), this table uses the data in Table 1 to obtain maximum-likelihood estimates of g, λ, and
σ from equation (7). These are in turn used to obtain estimates of, firstly, φ = r+ λ− g, and then,
from equation (4), the rental rate R for varying length of lease. Asymptotic standard errors are in
parentheses; for φˆ and rˆ, these are calculated using the delta method. The second and third panels
repeat this exercise for ground lease sales where the purchaser is an outside investor and the lessee
respectively.
Sample gˆ λˆ σˆ r + λˆ− gˆ Rˆ
T = 5 T = 10 T = 21
Full (n = 30) 0.078 0.106 0.266 0.073 0.100 0.094 0.084
(0.027) (0.030) (0.034) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002)
Sales to outside 0.075 0.104 0.234 0.074 0.101 0.095 0.085
investors (n = 12) (0.039) (0.043) (0.048) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003)
Sales to the 0.080 0.107 0.285 0.072 0.099 0.093 0.084
lessee (n = 18) (0.037) (0.042) (0.047) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004)
test statistic for normality of the adjusted residuals equals 0.170. Since the test statistic is
asymptotically distributed according to χ2[2], implying a p-value of 0.919, we cannot reject the
null hypothesis that the residuals are normally distributed at conventional levels of significance.
Turning to the Table 2 parameter estimates, we see that gˆ = 0.078, λˆ = 0.106, and σˆ = 0.266.
Together, these estimates imply φˆ = 0.073 and, for a 10-year lease, Rˆ = 9.4%. The corresponding
rental rates for 5- and 21-year leases are 10.0% and 8.4% respectively. Overall, the equilibrium
rental rate lies approximately halfway between the implied expected return on unimproved land
(4.5% + 10.6% = 15.1%) and the risk-free interest rate of 4.5%, reflecting the fact that the lease
payments are certain between rent reviews but are subject to the risk of changes in land value
at the review dates.
These results have two features of particular interest. First, the implied 10.6% risk premium
for unimproved land is consistent with other risk premium estimates for illiquid assets — see,
for example, Kerins et al. (2004) and Acharya and Pedersen (2005). Thus, our within-model
approach appears to adequately capture liquidity risks. Second, φ is very precisely estimated
even though g and λ, are not. This can be seen more clearly in Figure 1 which plots the
‘confidence ellipse’ for the latter two parameter estimates. For any combination of g and λ
inside the region bounded by the solid curve, we cannot reject the null hypothesis (at a 5%
level) that the parameters take these values. However, we can reject this hypothesis for any
combination outside the region bounded by the solid curve. The narrow shape of the ellipse
indicates that the estimates of g and λ are highly positively correlated, the source of which is
apparent from equation (6). Other than via the LS term, PS depends only on φ and not on the
individual values of g and λ, so the regression model — equation (7) — is close to being under-
identified. As a result of this property, any estimation error in gˆ (which affects the numerator of
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Figure 1: Confidence ellipse for average growth rate and risk premium
The point in the middle of the graph shows the point estimate of g and λ, while the two sets of
dashed lines show the 95% confidence intervals for each parameter separately. For any combination
of g and λ inside the region bounded by the solid curve, we cannot reject the null hypothesis (at
a 5% level) that the parameters take these values. However, we can reject this hypothesis for any
combination outside the region bounded by the solid curve.
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φ) will tend to be substantially offset by an estimation error in λˆ (which affects the denominator
of φ). Consequently, although the components of φ have relatively substantial estimation errors,
φ itself does not. And since the rental rate is a function of φ only (and not g and λ separately),
the precision in estimating φ feeds through into the estimated rental rates. For example, the
lease with ten-yearly rent reviews (T = 10) has an estimated rental rate of 9.4% with a 95%
confidence interval of [0.086, 0.102].
Our sales data sample contains two types of transactions: those where the lease is sold to an
outside investor and those where it is sold to the lessee. In case the dynamics underlying these
two cases differ, we repeat our estimation exercise for each group separately. Although, as can
be seen in the second and third panels of Table 2, this results in slightly higher standard errors
due to the smaller number of observations, it has no meaningful effect on the rental rate point
estimates: regardless of the type of transaction, the estimated rental rate is essentially identical
to that obtained for the full sample.
4 Concluding Remarks
Disputes over inter-party payments relating to asset ownership or assignment frequently arise.
Financial economists can often provide apparent solutions to such debates via analytical models
that offer a simple formula for the variable in dispute. However, such formulae invariably contain
unobservable parameters that themselves become the focus of dispute.
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A common approach to estimating these parameters consists of applying historical data
to additional analytical models that describe the determination of the relevant parameters.
However, the problems associated with this approach can lead to significant errors. In this paper,
we have described an alternative within-model approach that involves only the application of
the original analytical framework to actual market transactions in the asset that is the subject
of dispute. This approach has the singularly attractive feature that all unknown parameters
(including the policy, or disputed, parameter) are calculated within a single valuation framework,
thus avoiding the need to appeal to additional models that may or may not be consistent with
the original model, or to use data that may or may not be relevant to the asset of interest.
Applying the within-model approach to the determination of ground lease rental rates, we
have, first, developed a simple model of rent determination, and then, in conjunction with data
on ground lease sales, used this model to estimate both the unobservable parameters on which
the rental rate depends and the rental rate itself. All estimates obtained in this way appear to
be economically plausible, despite our data sample being quite small. In general, our approach
can be used wherever an appropriate asset valuation model is available and there are sufficient
secondary market transactions to provide a viable data set.
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